File

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: **Subject:** USSR Military Assistance to CCF **Date:** 10 June 1947

FROM: Theater Intell **TO:** Gen Willoughby **PHONE:** 26-6021 **NAME:** Col Dodge

Comment Number

Basic communication from War Department requests specific information on USSR Military Assistance to CCF. Our attached reply states in substance that: General: Soviet assistance to CCF has been concealed. There is no positive proof that Japanese equipment used by the CCF was physically turned over to them by the Soviets, nor is there proof that re-supply of Japanese type munitions, arms or equipment is derived from Soviet sources. The Soviets have avoided physical contact with CCF which could be observed by neutrals. It must be assumed that Japanese equipment being used by the CCF was conveniently left behind by withdrawing Soviet forces in Mongolia and Manchuria for the express purpose of supplying the CCF. Answers to Specific Questions: Soviet trained and equipped North Korean troops constitute at least 25 percent of the CCF regulars. Training centers have been organized in North Manchuria. Soviet instructors are employed. Soviet arms are reported being transported from Kraskino, USSR, to Hunchun, Manchuria. This report is evaluated by F-3. Interrogation repatriate from Dairen evaluated F-3, Soviet troops are holding joint maneuvers with CCF training units in Dairen. CCF training units employed Soviet weapons. The Mayor (Chinese) of Dairen is a Soviet puppet. Dairen Police are armed with Soviet rifles. US lend-lease vehicles transport CCF personnel. Japanese Industrial Material Used by Soviets: An interrogation states in effect that a secret Soviet organization, the Far Eastern Trading Company, is operated by Soviet citizens in conjunction with a Korean Communist group. The Korean groups operating with CCF 8th Army units collecting confiscated local products which are turned over to the Far Eastern Trading Company to be shipped to the USSR. In turn, the Soviet Union transports finished material to the CCF 8th Army Route via the same channels. Source evaluation F-3. The capability of the Soviets to produce Japanese type materiel exists, it could be placed in CCF hands through the channel mentioned above. The trend of increased shipping on the Vladivostok-Dairen Route, indicates the possibility of the Soviets supplying the CCF in Manchuria by water. Cargos reported are grain, oil, tanks, artillery pieces, motor vehicles, and troops. The major portion of military equipment was routed toward Dairen. On 2 June 47, a Soviet ship was reported carrying 23 Field Guns and seven trucks. The above noted weapons may be intended for the CCF. CNA commander at Chinwangtao on 31 May 47 expressed great concern over CCF possession of approximately 12 75 mm pack guns and unlimited ammunition. Reports indicate a heavy volume of foodstuffs being shipped by rail to the USSR in exchange for munitions. Transportation by road between the USSR and Manchuria is negligible. Water lift of CCF between North Korea and Dairen is reported. 10 to 20 junks per month, each carrying approximately 100 CCF troops, were reported leaving Dairen between December 46 and March 47.

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Permanent Record—Do not Detach

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FROM: Theater Intell **TO:** Gen Willoughby **PHONE:** 26-6021 **NAME:** Col Dodge

	Comment Number
A high Chinese naval source is reputed to have stated that Soviet fishing boats carrying arms and ammunition for the CCF had been captured by the Chinese Navy in the Chinwangtao-Hulutao area. Rail and road traffic between North Korea and Manchuria is used by the CCF. Movements are coordinated by the Soviets. An estimate of CCF troops moved into Korea between November 1946 and April 1947 is 80,000. These are said to be re-equipped, and re-trained under Soviet direction and moved back to Manchuria. Soviet assistance to the CCF thru Mongolia is deemed negligible. Air transportation of equipment from the USSR to the CCF in Manchuria has not been reported to date. There is no evidence of Soviet Tactical Air Support to the CCF.	1 (Cont'd)
2. Recommend signature and dispatch.	

1200 USSR.

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BASIC: Ltr ID, WDGS, File ID 906, 19 May 47, subj: "USSR Military Assistance to Chinese Communist Forces."

CB/OPNS (1) 1st Ind

G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 7 June 1947

TO: Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Reference is made to control No. CO-1000.2.

2. General:

(a) Soviet assistance to Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) has been for the most part cleverly concealed by the use of third nations (Korea and the Mongolias), the Port Arthur-Dairen Treaty Area, the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the impenetrable curtain of security on the Soviet-Manchurian Frontier. Information other than Chinese Nationalist on the subject reveals only a few unconfirmed instances wherein CCFs are said to be using Soviet manufactured equipment. Soviet personnel have been reported in various CCF areas. In the summer of 1946, a US observer saw a small Soviet party in Chih Feng Jehol. One of the Soviets made a speech at a local Chinese communist meeting which a local Catholic Priest attended. The priest reported that the Soviet in substance said that due to the present relationship between USSR, Great Britain, and the US that material aid by Soviets to CCF would be nil, but that Soviets would send liaison missions into CCF controlled areas. No Soviet vessels have been observed by US observers carrying CCF's.

(b) There is no positive proof to the effect that Japanese equipment used by the CCF was physically turned over to them by the Soviets, nor is there proof that a re-supply of Japanese type munitions, arms or equipment is being derived from Soviet sources. On the contrary, the Soviets have carefully avoided physical contact with CCF whenever such contact could be observed by neutrals/observers. Although agreements between Soviets and CNA and between CCF and CNA were that CNA would assume Sovereignty of Manchuria upon Soviet withdrawal, the tactics of Soviet withdrawal of troops were to delay notification to CNA of withdrawal from an area until CCF, which was in more favorable logistic position, could move in. It must be assumed that any Japanese equipment being used by the CCF was conveniently left behind by withdrawing Soviet forces in Mongolia and Manchuria for the express purpose of supplying the CCF. No official Soviet reports are available denoting the type and quantity of equipment captured along with the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, or what disposition was made of that material.

3. Answers to Specific Questions:

(a) The following points of pertinent information constitute all that is immediately available other than that which has been reported previously:

Specific Request

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(1) Of primary importance is the radio report from CG USAFIK #2001 638, 14 May 47, which discloses the following information: Soviet trained and equipped North Korean troops are being observed by CCP units in Manchuria. At present the number of troops of this type constitutes at least 25 percent of the CCP regulars. The North Korean troops are giving instruction to the CCP to achieve familiarization in Soviet arms and tactics. Activity of this type has been in effect for approximately one year. In addition, training centers similar to those in North Korea have been organized in North Manchuria under the control of the Lin Piao Headquarters at Chiamusau (46° 55' - 130° 25'). Soviet instructors are employed to familiarize CCP combat veterans with Soviet weapons. Shipment of Soviet arms in unknown quantities are reported being transported from Vladivostok, USSR, to Hunchun, Manchuria (42° 52' - 130° 29'). This report is evaluated by source A-3 and agrees in part with previous [illegible] and [illegible], China reports.

(2) A detailed interrogation of a former Japanese soldier repatriated from Dairen in March 1947, resulted in the following information, which is tentatively evaluated F-3: Soviet officers and troops are holding joint maneuvers with CCP training units in Dairen. Soviet officers were present during instruction on artillery methods held by Japanese instructors at the CCP Officers Training School in Dairen. CCP officers were carrying Soviet side arms. CCP training units employed 2 Soviet type submachine guns per squad. At least 50 weapons of that type were seen by source near Dairen. Source also observed several Soviet light machine guns in CCP hands during maneuvers. The above mentioned weapons were described in detail by source and unhesitatingly identified in a pictorial group of several similar weapons. The same source confirmed the report of a previous interrogation in which it was stated that the Mayor (Chinese) of Dairen is a Communist and a Soviet puppet, ostensibly under the direction of the CCP 8th Route Army, but actually being directed by the Soviets. In addition, the source stated that the Dairen municipal police, numbering some 1,000, are armed with Japanese rifles when on duty, but trained with Soviet rifles. Source also stated that he had observed 10 land-lease vehicles driven by Soviets, transporting CCP personnel.

(b) Japanese Industrial Material Used by Soviets:

Industrial activity in S.E. Siberia is increasing, including the production of implements of war. Interrogation reports, the main source of information, have failed to reveal whether or not the CCP is receiving Soviet manufactured material from this area. However, the following extract from Phase II Interrogation Number 36-II Central Interrogation Center, Japan, states in effect that a secret Soviet organization is called the Far Eastern Trading Company and is operated by Soviet citizens in connection with a Japanese Communist group which is a sister organization. The Korean groups which are operating all over Manchuria with CCP 8th Route Army units, make

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a business of collecting confiscated local products such as rice, sorghum and hides, which are turned over to the Far Eastern Trading Company to be shipped to the USSR. In turn, the Soviet Union transports finished materiel of unknown types and quantities to the CCP 8th Route Army via the same channels. This information coincides with previous reports by MID WD concerning the existence and location of the Soviet Far Eastern Trading Company. Source evaluation B-3. In view of possible removals of Japanese arms plants from North Korea by the Soviets, although there is no factual evidence of Soviet manufactured Japanese-type arms or munitions in use by the CCP, the capability on the part of the Soviets to produce such material does exist and it could be placed in CCP hands through the implementation of the channel mentioned in (b) above. More information on item (c) will be forwarded in a continuing report.

(d) Shipping between Vladivostok and Dairen has not been kept under constant surveillance due to operational difficulties and personnel shortages. However, a trend is indicated by the reported ship sightings in the Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan.

(1) Surveillance sightings for the month of April 47 noted 11 Soviet ships on the Vladivostok-Dairen route while only seven such sightings were noted in March, three in February, four in January and two in December. Since surveillance over these water routes has been periodic in nature, it precludes the ability at present to submit a true picture of Soviet maritime activity. The trend of increased shipping is indicated, and in conjunction with other intelligence, indicates the possibility of the Soviets supplying the CCP in Manchuria by water. The tonnage of Soviet vessels reported, is estimated at 210,000 tons enroute Dairen, (or Port Arthur) and only 70,000 tons enroute Vladivostok. The cargos reported are grain, oil, tanks, artillery pieces, motor vehicles and troops. The major portion of military [illegible] was routed toward Dairen. Troops of unknown numbers were reported aboard ships traveling both north and south. On 2 June 47 a Soviet ship enroute between Vladivostok and Dairen, was reported carrying a deck cargo which included 22 field guns, 6 of which were about 175 mm, and seven trucks, some bearing ammunition. As it is known that the USSR is firmly entrenched on the Kwantung Peninsula with 15,000 troops, including full strength in supporting arms, this gives rise to the speculation that the above noted weapons may be intended for the CCP, since there is no apparent reason for Soviet reinforcement of the present positions. In this connection, the CNA commander at Chinwangtao on 31 May 47 expressed great concern over CCP possession of approximately 12 75 mm pack guns and apparent unlimited source of ammunition for them.

(2) Rail transportation from the USSR into Manchuria is unrestricted in CCP controlled areas and is for the most part well cloaked by security. MID WD reports indicate a heavy volume of foodstuffs being shipped by rail to the USSR in exchange for munitions. The types and quantities of weapons and ammunition have not been specified. The center of this reported activity is

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Harbin and vicinity, where a large concentration of Soviet citizens is known to exist.

(3) Transportation by road between the USSR and Manchuria is held to be negligible in view of the known shortage of trucks and the poor condition of road nets. The short haul between the Kraskino, Posat, Vladivostok area and Hunchun Manchuria is logical and is reported in use. (par (a)).

(4) Water lift of CCF between Soviet controlled North Korea and Dairen is reported as being accomplished through the use of shipping other than Soviet. Vessels presumably of Chinese origin and operating freely out of Soviet controlled ports. 10 to 20 junks per month, each carrying approximately 100 CCF troops, were reported leaving Dairen between December 46 and and March 47. This report is based on the interrogation of two Japanese repatriates from Dairen. One source also stated that about 20 Soviet cargo and transport ships touched Dairen each month, bringing in troops, military supplies, fuel and food. Machinery from former Japanese plants was loaded for the outward trip. The Soviet Ambassador to China was recently reported to have inquired of the Chinese Foreign minister if he possessed any knowledge of 5 missing Soviet fishing boats which failed to return to Dairen. The Chinese Minister feigned ignorance but stated that an inquiry would be made. A high Chinese naval source is reported to have stated categorically that the Soviet fishing boats had been carrying contraband arms and ammunition destined for the CCF, had been captured by the Chinese Navy in the Chinwangtao-Suiyuan area, and would not be returned to the Soviets.

(5) Rail and road traffic between North Korea and Manchuria is freely used by the CCF to move troops and equipment according to reports from [redacted] and MID WD. These movements are coordinated by the Soviets and in many cases actually supervised by Soviet troops. The exact data pertaining to these movements is not available. An estimate based on fragmentary information, denoting the number of CCF troops moved into Korea between November 1946 and April 1947, is approximately 80,000. These troops are said to be re-equipped, re-trained under Soviet direction, and moved back to Manchuria.

(6) Soviet logistical assistance to the CCF thru Mongolia is deemed negligible in view of virtually non-existent rail lines and all-weather motor roads, plus the great distance involved. It has been reported, and is probably true that the Soviets have trained and equipped some of the Mongolian units now actively engaged on the CCF side of the present civil war in Manchuria.

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(7) Air support in the form of transport action of Russian equipment from the USSR to the CCP in Manchuria is a distinct and logical possibility but has not been reported to date. There is no evidence of Soviet Tactical Air Support in the CCP.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

O. E. Kiess
Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

This indorsement prepared from available information in Theater Intelligence Division in reply to request from Director of Intelligence WDGS, dated 19 May, File ID 906, subject: "USSR Military Assistance to Chinese Communist forces," which set forth specific information requirements of the Intelligence Division.

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3, NND 760021

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